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Strong international health agreements and good planning created a structure and common procedure for nations
involved in detection and evaluation of the emergence of influenza A (H1N1). This report describes a timeline of events
that led to the determination of the epidemic as a public
health emergency of international concern, following the
agreed-upon procedures of the International Health Regulations. These events illustrate the need for sound international health agreements and should be a call to action for
all nations to implement these agreements to the best of
their abilities.

Some have argued that the initial detection of the outbreaks was delayed (2), and others have opined that the
international disease surveillance and reporting system is
severely crippled by a lack of resources (3). Although these
debates will no doubt continue, it is crucial to document
how, starting with initial notification by Mexico, the systems for communication and disease mitigation worked essentially as they were designed.

I

The International Health Regulations (2005)

n March 2009, human cases of infection with a novel
strain of influenza A virus (H1N1) emerged in Mexico,
the United States, and Canada. As of May 26, this contagious virus has spread to 46 countries, accounting for
≈13,000 cases. To date, >90 deaths caused by this virus
have occurred, most of which have been in Mexico (1).
Suspected cases are even more widespread, and the number of cases will inevitably continue to increase and the
virus will spread to more countries in the coming weeks
and months.
Predicting the course of the epidemic is difficult, but
one can state with certainty that good multilateral plans and
agreements facilitated the initial notification of the disease.
Good planning has also enabled communication and action
around the emerging epidemic in a manner that has been
rational, predictable, and productive. These plans, which
only came into being in the past 5 years, enabled an unprecedented level of timely cooperation and communication for assessing and responding to the novel influenza A
virus (H1N1).
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Planning
A major international agreement, a regional agreement,
and a multitude of pandemic plans put into place since 2005
have set the stage for the events of the past few weeks. In
response to the threat of emerging infectious diseases, and
pushed into action by the events related to the emergence
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the World
Health Assembly agreed to accept the revised International Health Regulations in May 2005. These regulations,
known as IHR (2005), are binding to all member states of
the World Health Organization (WHO) and include several
major provisions aimed at facilitating global communication and cooperation for early detection and containment
of events termed public health emergencies of international
concern (PHEIC). Although many international efforts in
health have been disease specific, IHR (2005) focuses on
the larger issues of ensuring competent surveillance and
detection systems in every part of the world and a global
commitment to work together to mitigate the consequences
of a public health emergency.
Included in the regulations are provisions that member states are required to 1) establish a National IHR Focal
Point for communication with WHO, 2) meet core capacity
requirements for disease surveillance, 3) inform WHO in a
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timely fashion of any incident that might be considered a
PHEIC, and 4) respond to additional requests for information by WHO (4). The revised regulations broadened the
type of events that needed to be evaluated and reported to
WHO to include a list of always notifiable diseases and an
algorithm for determining a potential public health emergency, regardless of source or origin (5). In addition, the
regulations clearly articulate that the purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease” in a manner
that “avoids unnecessary interference with international
traffic and trade” (6).
The IHR (2005) were implemented in the summer
of 2007. Two nations submitted reservations; the United
States cited federalism concerns, and India clarified how
it would regard regions infected with yellow fever (7). By
the terms of the regulations, all member states should currently have in place a National IHR Focal Point for communication, should complete assessments of their disease
surveillance capacity by the summer of 2009, and should
develop and maintain their core surveillance and response
capacities by the summer of 2012.
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America

In March 2005, the United States, Canada, and Mexico launched a trilateral agreement called the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The purpose of this agreement was to enhance regional cooperation
and information sharing around business competitiveness,
energy, emergency management, securing of borders, and
health (8). The health focus within SPP was to enhance
public health cross-border coordination in infectious disease surveillance, prevention, and control. In particular,
leaders of the 3 nations agreed to a set of principles that
would guide collaboration in the detection and response
to avian and pandemic influenza. These principles led to
the formulation of the North American Plan for Avian
and Pandemic Influenza (NAPAPI). This plan stresses the
need for communication between nations and coordination
in responding to the threat of a novel strain of influenza;
it also lays out a set of actions for each nation relative to
emergency coordination and communications, avian influenza, pandemic influenza, border monitoring and control
measures, and critical infrastructure protection (9). A senior level coordinating body was established to facilitate
planning and preparedness as well as to serve as a contact
in the event of a human outbreak caused by a novel strain
of influenza (10).
Pandemic Plans

Spurred by fears of avian influenza (H5N1), the United
States embarked on an aggressive policy to put into place a
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series of plans at the federal, state, and local levels. These
pandemic plans address continuity of operations, social distancing strategies, vaccine and antiviral production and distribution, hospital surge capacity, and special considerations
for vulnerable populations. In addition to plans, there were
accompanying implementation schedules for implementing
necessary infrastructure in place to ensure the plans would
be useful should a pandemic emerge (11,12).
WHO has had a pandemic planning and guidance
document available since 1999. In 2005, WHO revised the
document in response to the threat of avian influenza. This
document was revised and rereleased in April 2009, in part
to reflect advances in global pandemic planning, the IHR
(2005) entry into force, and scientific advances in the development and stockpiling of countermeasures (13).
Events and IHR (2005)
I have outlined a series of events, beginning with the
reporting by Mexico of an outbreak of acute respiratory
illness. This event and subsequent events were linked with
the corresponding article or provision in the IHR (2005),
the SPP NAPAPI, or the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response guidance document. The events
were organized according to the major goals of the IHR
(2005): improving notification procedures, identifying
public health emergencies of international concern, facilitating ongoing global communication during an emergency, and mitigating the consequences of the event through
a coordinated response. In addition, the determination of
pandemic phases as part of the IHR (2005) procedures,
yet specific to this particular type of public health emergency, is discussed.
Notification
On March 18, 2009, surveillance systems in Mexico
alerted authorities to an unusual number of cases of influenza-like illness (2,14). After a few days of discussion starting on April 11 between the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Mexican authorities regarding unusual
numbers of acute respiratory infections, the authorities notified PAHO according to recommendations in IHR Focal
Points of a potential PHEIC. The event was an outbreak of
acute respiratory illness in the states of Veracruz and Oaxaca, Mexico (15,16).
On April 18, the United States, through the National
IHR Focal Point, notified PAHO of 2 cases of human influenza A (H1N1) in children in San Diego County and Imperial County, California. The United States assessed that
these cases could be a potential PHEIC (17).
The initial notification by Mexico and the United States
of a potential PHEIC within their borders aligns with the
following articles of the IHR (2005):
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•

IHR (2005) Article 4 (Responsible Authorities). Each
state is responsible for designating a National IHR
Focal Point for 24 × 7 × 365 communication with
WHO, including for dissemination of information
from WHO to relevant sectors of the state. These
National IHR Focal Points were used to officially
communicate the potential PHEICs to the regional
WHO office (PAHO).

•

IHR (2005) Annex 2 (Decision Instrument). The
decision instrument in Annex 2 helps nations
determine which events should be reported to the
WHO as potential PHEICs. Mexico and the United
States presumably used this decision instrument
to determine if the events constituted a potential
PHEIC.

•

IHR (2005) Article 6 (Notification). State Parties
shall notify WHO (through their WHO Regional
Office–PAHO in this case) by way of the National
IHR Focal Point of all events that may constitute a
PHEIC. This notification must occur within 24 hours
of assessment of the public health information by
the national authority. After a notification, the State
Party and WHO shall continue to communicate in a
timely fashion about the notified event.

Determination of a PHEIC
On April 25, the Director-General of WHO, after
convening a meeting of the Emergency Committee, determined that the outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1)
constituted a PHEIC and made a public announcement.
This was the first declaration of a PHEIC after the entry
into force of the IHR (2005) (18,19). The IHR Emergency
Committee, which was convened by the Director-General
on April 25, and which provides advice regarding the determination of the PHEIC, proposed that nations increase
their active surveillance for unusual outbreaks of influenzalike illness (20).
The formation of the Emergency Committee and the
process of declaring a PHEIC proceeded according to the
following provisions of the IHR (2005):
•

IHR (2005) Article 12 (Determination of a PHEIC).
The Director-General determines on the basis
of information received from the affected states
whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. If the
Director-General assesses the event to be a PHEIC,
she then consults the affected states regarding her
determination. Subsequently, the Director-General
seeks the views of an Emergency Committee.

•

IHR (2005) Article 48 (Emergency Committee:
Terms of Reference and Composition) and
Article 49 (Emergency Committee: Procedures).

The Director-General establishes an Emergency
Committee to provide views on whether an event
constitutes a PHEIC; the termination of a PHEIC;
and proposes issuance, modification, extension,
or termination of temporary recommendations for
mitigating the consequences of the PHEIC. The
Emergency Committee may meet by teleconference,
videoconference, or electronic communications.
Ongoing Communication
After initial notification of the potential PHEICs by
the United States and Mexico, WHO continued to maintain constant contact with the National IHR Focal Points.
PAHO coordinated communication between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada to better understand the emerging events (14,21).
National IHR Focal Points around the world continue
to supply daily reporting of confirmed and suspected cases
to WHO (22,23). WHO communicated with all member
states through the National IHR Focal Points and the WHO
public website to inform them of recommendations for actions to mitigate the consequences of the epidemic (24).
On April 28, PAHO hosted a teleconference with health
officials and ministers from 26 countries to exchange information on the influenza A (H1N1) epidemic (25).
The continued communication between the WHO and
Member States, as well as between Mexico, Canada, and
the United States, followed the regulations and provisions
in the IHR (2005) and the SPP NAPAPI:
•

IHR (2005) Article 6 (Notification). Following the
initial notification, the State Party and WHO shall
continue to communicate in a timely fashion about
the notified event, including sharing updated detailed
public health information on the notified event. This
information includes case definitions, laboratory
results, source and type of risk, and number of cases
and deaths.

•

IHR (2005) Article 11 (Provision of Information by
WHO). WHO, in the most timely fashion possible,
shall send information to all States Parties that enable
the States to respond to the public health risk.

•

IHR (2005). As part of IHR (2005), WHO developed
a secure Event Information website to share
timely information about public health events and
emergencies among State Parties and WHO. This
password-protected site is accessible to National
IHR Focal Points.

•

SPP NAPAPI. Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination
and Communications. Mexico, Canada, and the
United States agreed to share accurate and timely
information before and during an outbreak. The 3
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countries committed to working together so that all 3
nations use the same information to inform decision
making and action.
Coordinated Response
On April 25, a team of experts from PAHO arrived in
Mexico to assist with the outbreak. The team comprised
WHO experts from Geneva and Washington, DC, and
experts from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The team supported the efforts of Mexico in the
epidemiologic investigation, laboratory diagnosis, clinical
management, communication, and outbreak management,
and reported daily to WHO and PAHO (14,26).
WHO and PAHO arranged to have 489,000 treatments
(treatment for an adult was 75-mg capsules, twice a day for
15 days) of oseltamivir shipped to Mexico and other countries in the Americas. Approximately 220,000 treatments of
oseltamivir were shipped to 21 countries in the Americas
from the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in
Panama (27,28).
The Director-General of WHO, after receiving advice
from the Emergency Committee, made temporary recommendations to support the mitigation of the epidemic. WHO
did not recommend travel or trade restrictions related to the
virus but did recommend that persons who were ill delay
international travel and that persons in whom symptoms
developed after international travel seek medical attention
(18,29).
The United States and other countries with confirmed
cases shared isolates and sequences of the influenza A virus
(H1N1) with the international community in a timely fashion. Samples of the virus were shared for the purpose of risk
assessment, analysis, and for making seed vaccine (30,31).
The role and responsibilities of WHO for coordinating and assisting in the global response to a public health
emergency are outlined in the following provisions of the
IHR (2005):
•

IHR (2005) Article 15 (Temporary Recommendations). If a PHEIC has been declared, the DirectorGeneral shall issue temporary recommendations
according to the procedure set out in Article 49
(Procedures for the Emergency Committee).

•

IHR (2005) Article 13 (Public Health Response). At
the request of a State Party, WHO will assist in the
response to a public health emergency by providing
technical guidance, assessing the effectiveness of
control measures, and mobilizing international
teams of experts to send to the affected area.

Pandemic Phases
At the initial meeting of the Emergency Committee
on April 25, members decided to maintain the current
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WHO-designated pandemic phase at a level 3 (no sustained human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain
community-level outbreaks) (13,19). The Emergency
Committee met again on April 27, and on the basis of
the developing epidemic, recommended changing from
pandemic phase 3 to pandemic phase 4 (human-to-human
transmission is verified). Following this recommendation,
the Director-General upgraded the classification to pandemic phase 4 (20).
The epidemic continued to expand globally, and the
Emergency Committee met again and determined that the
pandemic classification should be changed from phase 4
to phase 5 (the same identified virus is causing sustained
community-level outbreaks in multiple countries). The Director-General announced on April 29 that the world was at
phase 5 on the WHO pandemic scale (32).
The meetings of the Emergency Committee followed
the protocol of the IHR (2005) discussed above. As part of
their recommendations for action, the committee cited the
following excerpt from the WHO preparedness document:
•

WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Section 3.2.2 (The Designation of the
Global Pandemic Phase). Per the pandemic plan of
WHO, the Director-General designated the global
pandemic phase, consistent with the applicable
provisions of the IHR (2005) and in consultation with
affected Member States. Phase 4 signals sustained
human-to-human transmission of the virus. Phase 5
indicates the virus is causing sustained outbreaks in
>2 countries. Phase 5 suggests that a pandemic is
imminent, although not a forgone conclusion.

Actions Outside the Regulations
Although the global community generally adhered to
the IHR (2005), supported WHO recommendations, and
participated in unprecedented levels of information sharing, there are still areas in which nations may be withholding information or make unilateral decisions that do
not support the language or spirit of the revised IHR. For
example, certain countries recommended against travel to
North America, although WHO did not issue such recommendations. Other nations interrupted trade of pork products from the United States, disregarding the determination
by WHO and global scientists that cooked pork does not
transmit the virus. In addition, some countries quarantined
North American citizens, regardless of potential exposure
to influenza A virus (H1N1). One of these countries defended its decision to quarantine persons from North America
by citing what it believed is the failure of the United States
and Mexico to implement entry and exit screening to detect cases of infection with influenza virus (H1N1) (33).
However, the US government referred to WHO advisory

Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 8, August 2009

International Health Regulations and Influenza A

and IHR Emergency Committee recommendations, which
to date are not advising entry and exit screenings because
WHO believes it would not help to reduce the spread of the
disease (29,34).
In the past few weeks, WHO received reports of infection with influenza virus (H1N1) from many nations
outside North America, several of which involved sizable
numbers of cases. However, these countries claimed that
their cases were linked to importation, with no sustained
human-to-human transmission within their borders. Recent
evidence in some nations of substantial increases in case
counts makes sustained human-to-human transmission
almost a certainty (which may lead WHO to raising the
pandemic level to 6, per the WHO definition of pandemic
phases). Further examination will be required to determine
if nations were hesitant to admit such transmission or if
previous cases were caused by importation (35).
Discussion
The rapid succession of events in this timeline describing the first weeks of international communication and collaboration around the outbreak of a novel influenza A virus
(H1N1) demonstrate the value of good planning and agreements for addressing public health emergencies. Creating
solid structures and procedures for dealing with emergencies has been shown to be essential for an appropriate response and mitigation effort. Although it is impossible to
predict the exact nature of an emergency, thoughtful planning enables all affected parties to know their responsibilities and to know with whom they need to work. Time is
not wasted on developing procedures and contacts during
an emergency. Instead, responders can focus on mitigating
the consequences of the event. Planning does not guarantee
that everything will run smoothly, or that all nations will
adhere to agreed-upon regulations. However, the current
situation suggests that mitigation outcomes and response
efforts will be more successful than an outcome if plans
and agreements did not exist.
Many of the provisions included in IHR (2005) came
about as a result of WHO and global experience during the
2003 SARS epidemic. Comparing the experience of SARS
with the current influenza (H1N1) event can serve as a
means of measuring the usefulness of the regulations. An
obvious comparison is the global communication mechanisms around an emerging epidemic. When WHO needed
to reach the global community to alert it to the emergence
of SARS, it needed to hold a press conference on a Saturday morning. No mechanism was in place for communicating with member states in a timely fashion. The creation
of National IHR Focal Points enabled rapid communication between WHO and the entire global community, and
guaranteed that proper authorities were notified and that information was shared with appropriate policy makers and

responders. If only for this reason, the IHR (2005) can be
deemed a success.
In this public health emergency, the revised IHR were
used accurately and appropriately. The regulations were
established in part to facilitate communication and formulate action in the identification of a PHEIC, and that is what
happened. The SPP agreement was put into place to ensure
regional cooperation in the event of a health emergency.
Mexico, Canada, and the United States followed the SPP
agreement and shared timely information. These events
should serve as a call to action for each nation to do its best
to fully implement IHR (2005) and engage in regional cooperation concerning disease surveillance and data sharing.
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